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Multiple Voices as a Means to Legal
Reform (A Response to Martha Fineman)
William E. Nelson
It may be useful to identify the many matters about which, I believe,
Martha Fineman and I agree in order to delineate more precisely our
areas of disagreement.
Fineman, for example, does not appear to question my historical peri-
odization. She seems to accept my findings that the 1920s and 1930s
were decades of legal enforcement of conventional morality; that the
1940s, 1950s, and 1960s were a time in which the law grew more permis-
sive toward male sexual freedom and excess; and that in the 1970s the
trend toward ever-expanding freedom was, in general, stopped and some-
times even reversed, as feminists began to articulate the harms to which
excesses of freedom led. It is significant that Fineman does not question
this doctrinal description of the "evolving eras of judicial action and
reaction."1
Instead, Fineman looks for disagreement by focusing on my "choices
of both subject and language," on the "tendencies of selection, omission,
and nuance" that shape my essay, and on "a consideration of the intersti-
ces of [my] language" (p. 346). She finds that my refusal explicitly to
position myself within the range of normative scholarship addressing the
subjects considered historically in my essay2 results in a narrative that is
ambiguous and confusing. As is suggested by her choice of subtitle-
"The Plot Might Change but the Message Remains the Same"-
Fineman assumes that my lack of overt support for feminist normative
positions amounts to a reactionary rejection of them.
In fact, I have great sympathy for them. I totally agree with the fact
observed by feminist scholars that the sexual freedom which judges legiti-
mated in mid-twentieth-century New York frequently resulted in "The
1. Martha Albertson Fineman, Gender and Sexual License: The Plot Might Change but the
Message Remains the Same (A Response to William Nelson), 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343, 349
(1993). Subsequent citations will be made parenthetically in the text.
2. I have always assumed that historians should strive to avoid taking normative stands on the
subjects they are investigating. While I recognize that such striving cannot result in writing that is
perfectly neutral and objective, it can facilitate inquiry into the complexities and nuances of the past
which more partisan history might easily overlook.
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Victimization of Women." ' 3 Like Fineman, I do not believe that Ameri-
can society during the 1950s and 1960s was marching toward a utopia of
"ever-expanding notions of sexual freedom and individual autonomy"
until the "radical intervention" of feminists interrupted the march (p.
344). I do not view the shift from the repression of the 1920s to the
sexual libertarianism of the 1960s as a sign of progress, nor am I shocked
by the feminist reaction that occurred during the 1970s.
I also agree with a central methodological point that Fineman makes.
Like all other intellectual constructions, my essay is a self-consciously
structured exercise in interpretation. I make no claim for its perfect neu-
trality or total objectivity, but only for its creative originality and faithful
adherence to the sources.4 I have no doubt that Fineman would have
constructed an essay completely different from the one I wrote. My
essay, like any that she might have decided to write, was profoundly
affected by the source materials I decided to examine and the questions I
chose to ask.
I disagree with Fineman, however, when she takes me to task for fail-
ing to explore the problematic character of gender and sexuality as cate-
gories. While I have never doubted the value of scholarship that
analyzes the social construction of gender and sexuality and thereby
shows how "women and men experience sexuality as well as other social
and cultural events differently" (p. 344 n.5), I did not choose to write on
that topic. My essay is part of a larger project about the history of legal
doctrine in twentieth-century New York, not about gender and sexuality.
In my larger project, I hope to examine how particular legal develop-
ments fit within a broader doctrinal mosaic and ultimately to relate the
entire mosaic, and not simply the particular narrow doctrines, to broader
social and cultural developments. I believe that this is an important and
legitimate approach to legal scholarship and one that can provide valua-
ble insights into law and legal development.
Indeed, I believe that my essay offers an important insight diametri-
cally opposed to the conclusion of Fineman's critique. In that conclu-
sion, Fineman ranks as more important than any other issue the question
of "[w]ho in this society gets to define" the bounds of the law (p. 349). In
contrast, I believe that the principles and standards which underlie deci-
sions are typically more important than who makes the decisions.
By her emphasis on who gets to decide, Fineman falls into the same
trap that ensnared the radical feminists of the 1970s. Either women must
make decisions or men must make them. Whoever makes decisions will
3. Indeed, I used this language for the title of the section beginning on p. 310 of my article. See
William E. Nelson, Criminality and Sexual Morality in New York 1920-1980, 5 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 265, 310 (1993).
4. I have elaborated my understanding of the nature of historical knowledge, with which I
understand my statement in the text to be consistent, in William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237, 1250-59 (1986).
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exercise control over the lives of those for whom the decisions are made,
and in the absence of principled standards limiting what decisions can be
made, control will quickly turn into domination. In the world of the
1950s and 1960s, when men had control over most decisions and the
ruling ideology favored freedom over limitation, men dominated and vic-
timized women.' Similarly, in an imaginable world in which women
make most decisions in pursuit of a goal of forcing "men... to renounce
their phallocentric personalities ... [and] to excise everything in them
that they now value as distinctively 'male,' "6 women will dominate and,
if their power is not subject to principled limitations, victimize men.
There is, of course, little reason for serious concern that women as a
group will dominate and victimize men as a group in the immediate days
to come. But that is precisely the problem. If what is centrally at stake
in regard to the issues discussed in my article is whether women or men
should have ultimate decisionmaking power, there is every reason to
expect that ancient patterns of male domination will continue. The
scholarship of 1970s feminists, establishing (among other things) that
women experience sexuality and other cultural and social events differ-
ently than do men, was enormously important in demonstrating that sex-
ual freedom for men entails expense for women. This feminist
scholarship made male freedom seem less free and hopefully also made it
less likely to be abused. Because many men do not yet appreciate how
their sexual expression can hurt women, the feminist perspective bears
repetition.7 But once everyone understands that freedom for anyone
inevitably imposes costs on others, a focus on the question of who should
be given the power of decision provides no basis for deciding anything,
including the question of who should decide. And there is every reason
to expect, if my tentative insights into the legal history of twentieth-cen-
tury New York survive in the final publication of a book, that the lack of
a basis for decision will result in indecisive efforts at reform and hence in
the retention of power by those who now hold it.
I have already done enough work to anticipate one of the book's major
themes: fundamental legal change occurred in New York between the
late 1930s and the early 1960s when New Yorkers shared a cohesive ide-
ology; but in the decades thereafter, when the state's pluralism produced
a cacophony of voices and perspectives, government and law slowly
withered as effective vehicles for social change. With the withering of
5. In the 1920s and 1930s, when accepted ideology counseled sexual restraint instead of freedom,
men still made most decisions and thereby dominated women, but women were probably less often
victimized.
6. ANDREA DWORKIN, OUR BLOOD: PROPHECIES AND DISCOURSES ON SEXUAL POLITICS 13
(1976), quoted in Nelson, supra note 3, at 320.
7. For like reasons, an emerging realization that granting new rights to women often entails real
expense for men will also be repeated with increasing frequency in the years to come. In a world of
multiple voices and perspectives, men too will begin to speak of the costs they bear.
1993]
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government and law, the wealthy and powerful gained enhanced practi-
cal freedom to pursue their self-interest-a pursuit that, as Fineman fully
appreciates, has devastated those with neither wealth nor power.
I join with Fineman in deploring the devastation to which the law con-
cerning sexual expression led in the 1950s and 1960s. Like her, I have no
wish to revive that law. I even agree that her "aspirations toward ...
destabilization" (p. 344) can sometimes serve as a useful first step toward
reform. But once destabilization begins to undercut the law's capacity to
promote social change rather than its capacity to preserve social order,
destabilization serves no further purpose for reformers. Those who want
change must then focus their energies not on creating multiple perspec-
tives and on internecine battles about whose perspective should govern,
but on working collaboratively to create a widely shared ideology which,
like that of the mid-twentieth century, holds genuine transformative
potential.
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